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Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate
Social Performance
Jordi Surroca and Josep A. Tribo´∗
Abstract: We examine empirically the relationships amongst managerial entrenchment prac-
tices, social performance, and financial performance. We hypothesize that entrenched managers
may collude with non-shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment
strategy; this is particularly so in firms that have efficient internal control mechanisms. Moreover,
we prove that the combination of entrenchment strategies and the implementation of socially
responsible actions have particularly negative effects on financial performance. We test these
contentions with a sample of 358 companies, from 22 different countries, for the period 2002–
2005.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social performance, earnings management, stake-
holder activism
1. INTRODUCTION
Agency theory has contributed to reinforce the long held view that agency problems
are at the core of conflicts that appear within organizations. The literature distinguishes
between two main agency problems: the conflict between large and small shareholders,
which generates minority expropriation issues (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986); and the
conflict between managers and shareholders that drives managers to pursue their
own private benefits at the expense of shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). The latter problem is exacerbated when managers are set on entrenchment:
∗The authors are from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Business Administration. They
wish to thank Carlos Bendito, Managing Director of Analistas Internacionales en Sostenibilidad (AISTM) –
a Sustainable Investment Research International Company partner firm based in Spain – for their helpful
comments and access to the SiRi ProTM database. They would also like to thank Martin Walker (editor), Diego
Prior, Stathopoulos Konstantinos, Joan Santalo´ and one of the anonymous referees as well as participants
at the JBFA Capital Markets Conference (Chapel Hill, 2007), the Academy of Management Annual Meeting
(Philadelphia, 2007), the Symposium of Corporate Governance & Shareholder Activism (Milan, 2007),
the Journal of Banking and Finance 30th Anniversary Conference (Beijing, 2006), the Strategic Management
Conference (Vienna, 2006), the Foro de Finanzas (Castellon, 2006) and the seminar participants at
Universitat Auto`noma of Barcelona for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. They also
acknowledge the financial support of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (grant #SEC2003-03797),
Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia (grant # SEJ2004-07877-C02-02 and grant #SEJ2006-09401), and the
Comunidad de Madrid (Grant #s-0505/tic/000230). The usual disclaimers apply.
Address for correspondence: Josep A. Tribo´, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Business
Administration, Calle Madrid, 126, Getafe (Madrid), Spain 28903.
e-mail: joatribo@emp.uc3m.es
C© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation C© 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 748
MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 749
they attempt to neutralize the disciplinary mechanism of the capital market so as to
maintain corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Managers, who place great value on control while holding only a small equity stake,
work to ensure their own job security, even though they are no longer competent or
qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Walsh and Seward (1990) discuss
classes of managerial entrenchment practices. Dual-class recapitalization, poison pills,
supermajority amendments, anti-takeover amendments, and golden parachutes are
examples of such practices. Others (Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988; and de Miguel
et al., 2004) emphasize that managerial ownership above certain levels is a takeover
deterrence mechanism that promotes managerial entrenchment. The use of these
mechanisms decreases managerial turnover, which is taken as another proxy of
managerial entrenchment (Denis et al., 1997; and Dahya et al., 1998). Finally, managers
can resort to income smoothing and other earnings management practices as a way of
improving their job security (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; and Yeo et al., 2002).
Although anti-takeover defenses may decrease the efficiency of external control
mechanisms, they do not have the same effect on internal control mechanisms.
Hence, in a context of well developed internal control mechanisms, a manager set
on entrenchment has all the incentives to seek the connivance of non-shareholder
stakeholders against the actions of shareholders. Along these lines, we continue the
work of Cespa and Cestone (2007) and hypothesize that entrenched managers collude
with employees, communities, customers, and suppliers to protect themselves from
internal disciplining mechanisms, causing a subsequent reduction in shareholders’
wealth. We rely on three arguments to justify the manager’s commitment to follow
stakeholder-friendly behavior, especially in those firms with efficient internal corporate
governance mechanisms. First, stakeholders generally acquire certain powers to
promote or penalize top executives (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998; Hellwig, 2000;
and Rowley and Berman, 2000); they can engage in costly boycotts and media
campaigns (Baron, 2001; Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001; and John and Klein, 2003),
and stakeholder representatives may be present on corporate boards (Luoma and
Goodstein, 1999; and Schneper and Guille´n, 2004). Moreover, due to the fact that
the manager retains the confidence of stakeholders, it will be difficult for displeased
shareholders to remove him because they would have to face pressure from the non-
shareholder stakeholders.
The second argument which justifies stakeholder concessions for entrenchment
purposes is that, by colluding with stakeholders, the manager reduces a firm’s attrac-
tiveness to potential raiders. For example, generous long-term stakeholder concessions
hinder the raider’s ability to generate profit (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Finally, we rely
on Sundaramurthy et al. (1997) to justify the positive, moderating role of internal
corporate control mechanisms that use stakeholder satisfaction as an entrenchment
mechanism. These authors show that the efficacy of some entrenchment mechanisms,
like anti-takeover measures, against external corporate governance mechanisms is
moderated by internal corporate governance mechanisms like board configuration.
We extend this result and argue that the moderating role of internal corporate
control mechanisms also holds for other entrenchment mechanisms like stakeholder
satisfaction.
In order to gain support from stakeholders, entrenched managers engage in a
broad array of practices to develop relationships with corporate stakeholders and
environmental activists; the so-called corporate social performance (CSP), as explained
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in Waddock (2004). This study specifically tests the hypothesis that managerial
entrenchment practices are positively related to improvements in CSP which, in turn,
negatively affect firms’ financial performance. Moreover, we expect this relationship
will be stronger in those firms with well-developed internal corporate governance
mechanisms.
We make use of an international database provided by the Sustainable Invest-
ment Research International Company, an international network of social research
organizations that scrutinizes firms with respect to their practices toward employees,
communities, suppliers, customers, the environment, and shareholders. These data
include and expand upon those of Kinder, Lyndemberg, Domini and Company (KLD).
Our final sample comprises 358 firms from 22 nations.
Our study advances the understanding of stakeholder phenomena by providing
evidence of another explanation for CSP: the entrenchment hypothesis (Cespa and
Cestone, 2007). Also, this study augments agency theory from a stakeholder perspective,
by examining the role employees, communities, customers, and suppliers, may play in
exacerbating or ameliorating conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.
We expand the game-theoretical model of Pagano and Volpin (2005) to include not
only workers but other stakeholders (Cespa and Cestone, 2007), and subsequently, we
empirically test its main propositions. Finally, we provide evidence of the entrenchment
motives that explain earnings manipulations like income smoothing (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1995; and Yeo et al., 2002) as well as their connection with CSP. Managers
smooth earnings, as part of an entrenchment strategy, in order to ensure the stability
of cash-flow streams so that they can satisfy the short-term interests of shareholders.
However, this practice may generate problems in the medium term. Then, in order to
eliminate possible medium-term problems that may put their jobs at risk, managers will
try to connive with non-shareholder stakeholders by satisfying the interests of this group
(improving a firm’s CSP). Hence, regardless of the entrenchment mechanism used, we
claim that entrenchment practices lead to improvements in a firm’s CSP, particularly
in the presence of strong internal corporate governance mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
most relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 is methodological and
describes the sample, variables and empirical models to be tested. The empirical results
obtained are presented in Section 4, while some extensions are addressed in Section 5.
In the final section, we lay out the main conclusions of this research and discuss the
significance of our results.
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Traditionally, agency theory has dominated the analysis of corporate governance. Its
main concern is the separation of ownership and control which generates minority
expropriation problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) as well as problems between
managers and firm owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Focusing on managerial
actions that damage shareholder interests, one of the costliest manifestations of these
actions is managerial entrenchment; and this can take a variety of forms. Among
them are: the issue of common stock with limited voting rights, exchanged for a
certain number of original common shares; poison pills; new security issues; specific
acquisitions and divestitures; supermajority amendments; golden parachutes; and
earnings smoothing. Additionally, managers may try to accumulate stakes large enough
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to eliminate the threat of takeover but not too large in order to avoid incurring the
internalization of entrenchment costs. Hence entrenchment is expected to be found
in a middle range of managerial ownership (Morck et al., 1988; and de Miguel et al.,
2004). This set of mechanisms defines an entrenchment strategy that could decrease
managerial turnover (Denis et al., 1997; and Dahya et al., 1998).
Remarkably, these strategies are used principally by managers to deal with the
pressure from external corporate control mechanisms, as defined by Shleifer and
Vishny (1997). The market for corporate control, product market competition
or managerial labor markets are examples of external mechanisms of corporate
governance aimed at reducing the agency problems linked to managerial actions.
However, there are other control mechanisms that are effective in preventing the
aforementioned entrenchment practices, and are defined as internal (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Among these internal mechanisms are: stock-options and other forms
of performance-based payment schemes; control structures such as the presence of
institutional blockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986); the presence of outsiders on
the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983); or the existence of committees for
audit, remuneration and nomination control (Vafeas, 1999; and Anderson and Reeb,
2004).
Hence, those managers that even under the close scrutiny of internal corporate
control mechanisms are set on entrenchment, need to reinforce their entrenchment
strategy by adopting some additional initiatives. We augment the propositions from
Cespa and Cestone (2007) and highlight stakeholder satisfaction as one of the
initiatives achieved when internal corporate control mechanisms are well developed.
Stakeholders wield significant power within the firm. They can organize boycotts and
lobbies to demonstrate such power (Baron, 2001; Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001; and
John and Klein, 2003). Further, stakeholders may exercise their influence via the
board of directors, when the board includes representations from labor, creditors, and
regulatory agencies (Schneper and Guille´n, 2004). Under such a control structure,
managerial decisions are monitored and influenced by the presence of stakeholder
representatives (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Finally, the actions of stakeholders may
influence the threat of a hostile takeover and with that their own CEO replacement.1
Then, when internal corporate governance mechanisms are well developed, managers
tend to reinforce their entrenchment strategy by canvassing support from stakeholders
so as to channel the efforts of the latter to the entrenched manager’s own advantage.
This strategy enjoys the benefit of diminishing pressure from activist stakeholders
while at the same time countering the pressure from other internal corporate control
mechanisms. To operationalize such behavior, managers may engage in practices to
create and manage relationships with corporate stakeholders, the so-called CSP.
Our entrenchment argument for improving CSP is explained by the stakeholders’
power to influence the firm. As such, our story belongs to the descriptive realm of
stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997). According to this theory, the degree to which
managers assign priority to competing stakeholders’ claims – stakeholder salience –
is positively related to the cumulative number of stakeholder’s attributes of power,
legitimacy, and urgency. Thus, a manager who wants to implement an entrenchment
1 Schneper and Guille´n (2004) show that the frequency of hostile takeovers is inversely related to
stakeholders’ (non-shareholder) power, and this result may explain why countries labeled as stakeholder-
oriented like Germany or Japan are characterized by the low occurrence of hostile takeovers.
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strategy will want to be protected against the actions of powerful stakeholders. In that
case, there are two possibilities: collaboration or confrontation.
Jones (1995) and Hill and Jones (1992) supported the confrontation strategy. Jones
(1995), attributing the implications of his instrumental theory, suggested that decreases
of CSP are connected to a managerial entrenchment strategy. In a similar vein, Hill
and Jones (1992) predicted that managers will undertake strategic actions to reduce
stakeholder power – strategies that negatively affect corporate efficiency.
Our claim, as in Cespa and Cestone (2007), is the opposite: we hypothesize that
stakeholders and incumbent managers will be natural allies, particularly when there are
efficient internal corporate governance mechanisms capable of preventing managerial
entrenchment impulses. In that case, collaboration with stakeholders cannot easily be
blocked by shareholders, if based only on a ‘suspicious’ entrenchment strategy. This
stimulates managers’ incentives to improve CSP with entrenchment intentions. Hellwig
(2000) pointed out that managers set on entrenchment will find allies in stakeholder
sectors such as the political system, labor, the media, the judiciary, and universities.
In addition, the implementation of expensive policies aimed at improving a
firm’s CSP reduces its attractiveness to a raider. Generous long-term contracts with
workers and suppliers, as well as long-term commitments to support environmental or
philanthropic organizations are too heavy a burden to be borne by a raider (Pagano and
Volpin, 2005). These concessions, however, are not fully internalized in share prices, for
two reasons. First, as stakeholder theory researchers have already demonstrated (e.g.,
Berman et al., 1999), maintaining good relationships with key stakeholders creates an
organizational resource that leads to more effective use of a firm’s resources; this has
a positive impact on financial performance. Therefore, in a context of information
asymmetries, capital markets will be unable to determine if social concessions are a
means of improving financial performance by generating a valuable organizational
resource or if they are part of an entrenchment strategy (market inefficiency). And
second, as mentioned earlier, social concessions related to the implementation of an
entrenchment strategy are triggered mainly in the presence of strong internal corporate
governance mechanisms. The existence of such mechanisms, together with the market
inefficiency assumption, hinders any steep reductions in share prices.
Therefore, anticipating the impact of generous CSP initiatives in terms of reductions
in stakeholder activism as well as reductions in the pressure from existing shareholders
and potential raiders, we state the following hypothesis:
H1: Managerial entrenchment practices have a positive impact on a firm’s social
performance. This effect is more pronounced in firms with efficient internal
corporate governance mechanisms.
It is important to state that internal corporate governance mechanisms, while playing
a positive moderating role by controlling the connection between entrenchment and
CSP, also constrain managerial discretion. This would hinder the implementation of
expensive socially responsible activities. That is, we also expect a negative direct effect
of the internal governance mechanisms on a firm’s CSP.
Finally, as mentioned before, agency theory shows that there is another conflict of
interest within the firm that affects large and small shareholders, which may result in
a minority expropriation by large shareholders. Some authors like Barnea and Rubin
(2006) have argued that certain CSP activities may be connected to expropriation.
Thus, managers may collude with large shareholders in order to expropriate minority
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shareholders by promoting intensive CSP policies. This collusion can be used as
an entrenchment mechanism as it reinforces the managerial position with respect
to the largest shareholders. Hence, in order to avoid this spurious connection
between entrenchment and CSP, we have to control for variables that capture minority
expropriation risks, such as ownership concentration.
(i) Types of Stakeholders: Employees
Within the managerial entrenchment strategy, workers constitute one of the stake-
holder groups that receive preferential attention from the manager because they have
the capacity to influence a firm’s behavior and, at the same time, share common
interests with incumbent managers. As a consequence, it is likely that entrenched
managers, particularly those that face pressure from efficient internal corporate
governance mechanisms, will commit themselves to giving employees more concessions
(e.g., generous salaries).
The capacity of employees to influence decision-making, organizational arrange-
ments and performance outcomes is well documented in previous literature (see for
example, Schneper and Guille´n, 2004). This power is derived from political action or
legal mechanisms that are at their disposal. By political action we mean that workers may
lobby against/in favor of an incumbent CEO by demonstrating, mobilizing politicians,
appealing to the media, and constituting organized pressure groups like trade unions
(Pagano and Volpin, 2005). In addition, the employees’ power to promote or penalize
top executives is amplified when they have institutionalized legal mechanisms at their
disposal. One such mechanism is the presence of stakeholder directors on corporate
boards, or board subcommittees such as the audit, compensation, executive, and
nominating committees (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Furthermore, workers can
directly affect the likelihood of CEO replacement through individual share ownership.
Importantly, employees are not only a powerful stakeholder group, but are natural
allies of managers set on entrenchment. There is a vast literature that demonstrates
that hostile takeovers have negative consequences for workers (Aguilera and Jackson,
2003) and that consequently they these tend to be opposed (Schneper and Guille´n,
2004). In countries with low employment protection, a hostile takeover may result in
job cuts and cause deterioration in working conditions. Successful raiders renegotiate
the labor contracts that already exist, cutting wages to a minimum and stepping up
monitoring to maintain workers’ effort (Conyon et al., 2001).
In addition to the previous arguments, managers may be interested in colluding with
employees, not only to gain their support, but also to reduce a firm’s attractiveness to any
potential raiders interested in companies with efficient internal corporate governance
mechanisms. In such cases, employment policy is likely to be used to deter hostile
takeovers (Pagano and Volpin, 2005), particularly in a context of inefficient financial
markets that are more likely to be found in non-Anglo-Saxon countries. In these
countries, social concessions to workers are more commonplace and difficult to reverse.
Such arguments suggest the following hypothesis:
H2: Managerial entrenchment practices have a positive impact on employee satisfaction.
This effect is more pronounced in those firms with efficient internal corporate
governance mechanisms.
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(ii) Performance Analysis
The instrumental approach is an important perspective of stakeholder theory
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). It advocates the formulation and implementation
of activities that satisfy stakeholders because they control key resources and suggests
that stakeholder satisfaction, in turn, will ensure the long-term survival and success
of the firm (Freeman, 1984; and Hillman and Keim, 2001). Accordingly, stakeholders
that own resources relevant to the firm’s success will be more willing to offer their
resources in the expectation of fulfillment of their different claims and needs (Strong
et al., 2001). Therefore, under this approach we expect that stakeholder satisfaction will
lead to higher commitment, greater effort, and, ultimately, to superior performance
(Hosmer, 1994; and Stevens et al., 2005). Thus, stakeholder management has strategic
value from a ‘means to an end’ perspective (Berman et al., 1999), which is opposed to
the intrinsic value of the normative approach.
However, consistent with our previous propositions, we argue that when managers
implement entrenchment practices, the negative effect of such practices on share-
holders’ value (Walsh and Seward, 1990; and Sundaramurthy, 2000) is reinforced with
improvements in CSP.
Importantly, Sundaramurthy et al. (1997) and Sundaramurthy (2000) suggest
that the strength or weakness of internal monitoring mechanisms, such as the
board structure and the ownership concentration, moderate the relationship between
certain entrenchment practices like anti-takeover provisions and shareholders’ wealth.
Remarkably, we have suggested in previous hypotheses, that a manager trying to insulate
himself from internal monitoring mechanisms may also follow a generous policy of
social concessions. Therefore, these managerial concessions to stakeholders, especially
in the context of existing internal governance mechanisms that are efficient, should
play a moderating role in the connection between the implementation of entrenchment
practices and financial performance. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) termed these types
of concessions as discretionary CSP and pointed out that it is negatively related to
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, we expect this moderating role to be negative. Stated
formally:
H3: Managerial entrenchment practices when combined with social concessions have
a negative impact on financial performance. This is particularly evident when
social concessions are triggered in a context in which there are efficient internal
governance mechanisms.
Finally, we expect that this result also holds good when we focus on the specific
dimension of social performance: workers’ satisfaction. This is because social conces-
sions to workers are particularly costly and, at the same time, they strongly reinforce the
entrenchment position of the manager with regard to shareholders, given the saliency
of these stakeholders to achieve the firm’s success. This stakeholder characteristic is
particularly attractive in a context where efficient governance mechanisms aimed at
preventing entrenchment are present. In such situations, social concessions, mainly to
salient stakeholders like workers, will be needed in order to reinforce any entrenchment
strategy. Hence, the negative impact of entrenchment on performance will be more
evident when combined with workers’ satisfaction:
H4: Managerial entrenchment practices, when combined with social concessions to
workers, have a negative impact on financial performance, especially in a context
in which there are efficient internal governance mechanisms.
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3. METHODS
(i) Sample and Variables
We derive our sample by accessing different databases. The SiRi PROTM database,
compiled by the Sustainable Investment Research International Company (SiRi) – is
the world’s largest company specializing in socially responsible investment analysis.
SiRi performs this analysis based on: reporting procedures, policies and guidelines,
management systems, and key data. The necessary information is extracted from
financial accounts, company documentation, international databases, media reports,
interviews with key stakeholders, and ongoing contact with management.2 The
information extracted from each firm is condensed into 199 information items
that cover major stakeholder issues such as community involvement, environmental
impact, customer policies, employment relations, human rights issues, activities in
controversial areas (e.g., alcohol), supplier relations, and corporate governance. We
complement these data on corporate responsibility with financial data from 2000–2005,
extracted from OSIRIS, a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) that provides
information on financial, ownership and earnings for 38,000 companies, including
listed, unlisted and de-listed companies from over 130 countries. Finally, we obtain data
from Bloomberg on the MSCI world index in order to compute one of the variables
of performance (the abnormal returns). The result of merging these databases is a
sample composed of 358 industrial firms3 from 22 different countries, all included at
least once in the 2002–2005 period.4
(ii) Measures
Corporate social performance (CSP). This variable is approached through the SiRi PROTM
ratings. Five research fields are devoted to measuring the level of a firm’s responsibilities
to its stakeholders: community, customers, employees, environment, and vendors and
contractors. Another section provides an overview of firms’ corporate governance
practices. However, we have excluded this part from our measure of CSP, because in
our study we focus on the degree of satisfaction of the non-shareholders’ stakeholders.
For each stakeholder, the database addresses a firm’s attributes in four areas: levels
of transparency and disclosure; the existence of corporate policies and principles
related to the stakeholder; the importance of management procedures; and the level
of controversies with respect to this stakeholder. In each of these areas, there are
information items that result in a Likert-type scale score ranging from 0 (worst) to 100
2 SiRi does not ask companies if they wish to be included in the survey. SiRi provides detailed profiles on
the largest global companies in collaboration with SiRi’s national partners. Each national partner, using
harmonized methodology, scrutinizes social dimensions of the main corporations in its respective home
market. Beginning with the largest companies, year-to-year, national partners expand the sample of compa-
nies analyzed, with the final objective of covering the whole home capital market (visit www.siricompany.com
for more details).
3 Although our initial sample had 777 firms, we concentrate on the 358 firms that correspond to 448
observations from which we obtain information on all the variables needed to estimate our specifiations.
This does not generate a bias because the mean values for the main variables in our sample are not significantly
different from those of the original sample composed of 777 firms.
4 The distribution of observations among the most significant countries is: US (35%), UK (12.1%),
Switzerland (11.2%), France (9.6%), Denmark (7.1%), Spain (4.9%), Italy (3.6%) and Japan (3%).
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(best). Importantly, each information item is weighted according to a methodology
developed by SiRi. These weights are sector-specific and change annually. The corporate
social performance indicator used in this study is the corresponding SiRi measure defined
as the weighted sum of non-shareholders’ stakeholder scores (the scores of community,
customers, employees, environment, and vendors and contractors), using SiRi’s weights
but excluding the items that give information on transparency and disclosure for each
stakeholder. This reduces any endogeneity problems because the level of disclosure
of certain costly practices aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ interests may have a clear
impact on investment and disinvestment decisions by outside investors and may well
trigger managerial entrenchment practices.
Workers’ satisfaction (Workers). We approach this issue using the score for the level of
a firm’s responsibilities to its employees. This score is an aggregation of 37 indicators
that cover different aspects of the firm’s involvement in workers’ issues. Also, in order
to avoid endogeneity problems, we exclude the items related to transparency and
disclosure from the definition of worker satisfaction.
Performance. We measure performance using three different proxies in order to provide
more robust results. First, the return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of earnings
before interest and tax to total value of assets. Second, Tobin’s q; which is defined on a
log scale as the ratio of the sum of market equity value, plus a firm’s liabilities, to the
total assets. Last, we use abnormal returns (Abn Returns) computed using the MSCI
world index as a factor. More specifically, these abnormal returns are computed as
the difference of the expected monthly returns derived from a CAPM model using a
window of five years from the firm’s equity return in the corresponding year.
Managerial entrenchment. We use the measures for entrenchment provided by the SiRi
PROTM database that approximates the existence of anti-takeover devices, limitation of
shareholders’ voting rights, existence of multiple classes of stock with different voting
rights, managers’ stake and tenure.5 More specifically, Anti-takeover is a dummy that is
equal to 1 if the firm has implemented any of the following anti-takeover measures:
voting caps, increased voting rights over time, restrictions on board appointment
rights, and poison pills. Shareholders Rights is measured by a 3-point Likert scale: the
highest value of this item corresponds to the situation in which major controversies
have impact on the rights and treatment of shareholders, for example, governance
arrangements that detrimentally affect the interests of shareholders, insider trading
scandals involving company directors, or major conflicts of interest among board
members. The intermediate value indicates the existence of controversies, both major
and minor, but where the company has taken credible steps to resolve the problem.
Finally, the other cases receive the lowest value. The variable OneShare OneVote is a
dummy that is equal to 1 if the company has multiple classes of stock with different
voting rights, and is otherwise equal to 0. Gompers et al. (2006) demonstrate the
perverse effect of having dual-class shares on firm value, caused by the distinction
between cash-flow rights and voting rights. Concerning managerial ownership, the
literature shows that this variable can also be used as an entrenchment device. To
do so, we estimate Tobin’s q in terms of managerial ownership, its quadratic term,
and cubic terms (Morck et al., 1988; and de Miguel et al., 2004). In the definition of
5 In the robustness section, we introduce another measure: the income smoothing.
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managerial ownership, we include the holdings of pension funds, bearing in mind that
managers can exercise some influence in the composition of such a stake (Farinha,
2003). With regard to controls, we also incorporate size, leverage and investment, as
defined below. The results show that the relationship between Tobin’s q and managerial
ownership is decreasing in the range between 17% and 69.8%.6 Hence, we characterize
this entrenchment region with a dummy (Managown Entrench) that is equal to 1 when
managerial stake is in this region; and 0 otherwise.7 Finally, we have used a more direct
measure of entrenchment that is also positively related to managers’ holding; this is the
manager’s tenure. More specifically, Manager Tenure is defined as a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if the directors’ term in office (including managers) is more than three
years, and 0 otherwise. We choose this threshold because Fredrickson et al. (1988) show
that a disproportionately large number of CEOs have tenure that lasts three years or
less. In that case, a CEO with tenure larger than three years is a potential candidate to
become a manager that follows entrenchment practices.
In addition to providing results using each indicator separately, we also aggregate
the scores for these five indicators. The resulting score is labeled as Entrenchment.8 Also,
in the specifications explaining market measures of performance, we do not include
the variable Managown Entrench (defined in terms of Tobin’s q) in the definition of
Entrenchment, in order to avoid endogeneity problems. Finally, we characterize large
values of entrenchment through a variable DEntrenchment which is equal to Entrenchment
when the value is larger than the mean of the sector for the corresponding year; and 0
otherwise.
Internal corporate governance mechanism. According to our framework, we apply controls
to test the strength of internal corporate governance, using different variables to
approach this issue. Audit Committee, Nomination Committee, and Remuneration Committee
are three dummy variables obtained from SiRi; each one receiving the value 1 if such a
committee exists with independent members. Due to the high correlation among these
variables, we define Control Committee as a 4-point Likert scale in which 0 represents the
absence of any one of these committees and 3, the joint presence of independent audit,
nomination, and remuneration committees. Non-dual CEO is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 when the chairman is not the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Board Independence is
SiRi’s Likert-type variable that takes three different values contingent on the percentage
of independent directors with respect to the mean value of the sector.9 The highest
value corresponds to the situation in which a majority of non-executive directors are
considered independent; the intermediate value indicates that 50% or less of
6 In de Miguel et al. (2004), the range found using Spanish data is between 30% and 70%.
7 The existence of an entrenchment region with intermediate values of managerial stake may explain that
increases in managerial ownership may not prevent managers of behaving opportunistically and commiting
fraud, even under the close scrutiny of financial markets (Sen, 2007).
8 For the sake of robustness, this variable has also been computed using the principal components of the
aforementioned indicators and the results found remain the same, qualitatively.
9 According to the SiRi questionnaire, a director is not considered independent when assessing business
may result in a conflict of interest. This precludes, among other things, a director that has held an executive
position within the company group; and/or is on the board of a significant customer or supplier to the
company; and/or has had an association with the company of more than nine years; and/or is related
through blood, marriage or equivalent to other directors or advisers to the company.
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non-executive directors are independent; and zero in other cases.10
Performance Evaluation is another SiRi Likert-type scale variable that can take
three different values; it takes the value of 2 when two conditions are met: there is a
board performance evaluation system, and there are no controversies on executive
payments like payment unrelated to performance, the existence of golden parachutes,
the repricing of options, or excessive pension benefits. This variable has a value of 1
when only one of the previous conditions is met and 0 in other cases.
Another mechanism for internal control is the role played by large shareholders.
We studied this issue by employing measures of ownership concentration as well
as the stakes in the hands of government. State Ownership is the percentage of
ownership in the hands of the state. Ownership Concentration is the stake of the
three largest blockholders,11 where we have excluded the manager’s stake in order
to avoid confounding effects with such a variable that is used as a proxy of
entrenchment.
Finally, in order to study the existence of differential effects of entrenchment
on CSP contingent on the aforementioned corporate governance mechanisms,
we define the following variables that characterize situations with strong internal
corporate governance mechanisms. DControl Commitee is a dummy that is equal to
1 if the variable of Control Committee is larger than the mean of the sector for the
corresponding year; and 0 otherwise. Following the same logic we define DNon-
dual, DBoard Independence, DPerformance Evaluation, DState Ownership and DOwnership
Concentration.
Control variables. We control for financial structure, dividends, size, firms’ age,
performance, investment, growth opportunities, industry, country, and year. To control
for the financial structure, we use the variable Debt that measures the gearing of
the company. This is defined as the ratio of non-current liabilities plus loans, to
shareholders’ funds. Dividend is the long-term dividend policy. This is characterized
by the sector average pay-out ratio times the firm’s after-tax profits. We have used this
sectoral component in order to reduce potential endogeneity problems, given that
stakeholder satisfaction has a clear impact on the proportion of funds transferred to
shareholders (pay-out ratio). Size is the value of fixed assets; and Age is the number
of years of the company’s existence. We include the aforementioned return on assets
(ROA) as a control for financial performance in the specifications of CSP as dependent
variable. Investment is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Growth is equal to 1 when the
rate of increase in sales is larger than the value for the corresponding sector and year,
and 0 otherwise. Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets. In some
specifications, we classify the countries according to the origin of their legal codes.
We follow La Porta et al. (1998) in distinguishing four types of countries according to
the origin of a country’s legal code: (i) British common law, (ii) French civil law, (iii)
German civil law, and (iv) Scandinavian civil law.
10 The effectivity of the board of directors as control mechanism will depend negatively on the power of the
manager (Lasfer, 2006) but positively on external control mechanisms like the product market competition
(Bozec, 2005).
11 Alternatively, we use the stake of the largest shareholder and that of the five largest, and the results remain
qualitatively the same.
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(iii) Empirical Analysis
We rely on two basic specifications to contrast our hypotheses, one explaining CSP in
terms of entrenchment and corporate governance; the other to explain performance
in terms of entrenchment and CSP.
We estimate our specifications using panel-data techniques;12 clustering the standard
errors by firm (Petersen, 2006) in order to prevent firm effects given the persistence of
the measures of social performance.13 In accordance with Petersen (2006), we do not
cluster the standard errors by year because the variability of CSP in each year is already
high enough (three times larger than the variability by firm).
In order to explain a firm’s CSP together with worker satisfaction and test hypotheses
1 and 2, we consider the following basic specification:14
CSPi t+1 = α1 + α2Entrenchmentit + α3Control Committeeit + α4Non-dual CEOi t
+ α5Board Independenceit + α6Performance Evaluationit
+ α7State Ownershipit + α8Ownership Concentrationit + α9Debtit
+ α10Dividendit + α11Sizeit + α12Ageit + α13ROAi t + α14Investmentit
+ α15Growthit + α16Intangiblesit + εi t . (1)
We conduct further estimations of specification (1)15 by breaking the
variable Entrenchment into its basic components: Anti-takeover , Shareholders Rights,
OneShare OneVote, Managown Entrench, and Manager Tenure. Also, to study the possible
moderating effect of the variables of governance, we crossed the aforementioned
variable DEntrenchment times the dummies, measuring the strength of internal
governance mechanisms. The resulting multiplicative variables are the following:
DControl Committee ∗ DEntrenchment, DNon-dual ∗ DEntrenchment, DBoard Independence ∗
DEntrenchment, DPerformance Evaluation ∗ DEntrenchment, DState Ownership ∗
DEntrenchment, and DOwnership Concentration ∗ DEntrenchment. We focus on significant
values of entrenchment because we expect them to appear as a reaction to the
existence of strong internal control mechanisms. In such situations we have argued
that CSP would be used as part of an entrenchment strategy (hypothesis 1).
It is important to stress that by using fixed-effect estimations, we eliminate the
unobservable heterogeneity that may be potentially correlated with the independent
12 For robustness (available upon request from the authors), we have also used cross-section estimations,
and the main results coincide with those found using panel-data techniques.
13 To test whether the effects are fixed or random, we used the Hausman test. When this test reveals that there
is no correlation between the firm-specific error component and the explanatory variables, we use random-
effects estimations because it is the most efficient alternative (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results show
that a majority are fixed-effect estimations.
14 We rule out specifications that include the dependent variable lagged by one period because the
persistence in CSP may generate endogeneity problems that can only be tackled through GMM estimations.
Unfortunately, the limited number of years available does not permit us to use such a technique. Nevertheless,
in an unreported estimation, available upon request from the authors, we introduce the dependent variable
lagged by one period and estimate such a specification using clustered fixed effects. The results found are
consistent with those reported in Table 3 and, remarkably, the coefficient of the CSP variable lagged by one
period is not very significant. This may suggest that the question of persistence does not significantly bias
the results.
15 For estimates using fixed effects, temporal, sectoral and country dummies are not needed. For random-
effects estimation, we correct by temporal, sector and country effects by detracting from the dependent
variable its mean value for the corresponding year, sector and country.
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variables. For example, the intrinsic characteristics of the manager should condition
a firm’s CSP activities and, at the same time, may be connected to the definition of
an entrenchment strategy as well as with the governance characteristics of the firm.
Additionally, as we explain in the theoretical section, we expect that pressure from
different stakeholders is connected to different internal corporate control mechanisms.
This means that an endogeneity problem in specification (1), which is not directly
connected to the unobservable heterogeneity, may exist perfectly. We tackle this
problem by advancing the dependent variable by one period.
Concerning hypothesis 2, we slightly modify the previous specification and substitute
the dependent variable of CSP with that of Workers’ satisfaction (Workers).
In order to test hypotheses 3 and 4, we focus on a specification that defines corporate
financial performance in terms of entrenchment and CSP. The basic specification is:
Performanceit+1 = β1 + β2Entrenchmentit + β3CSPi t + β4DEntrenchment DCSPi t
+ β5Control Committeeit + β6 Non-dual CEOi t
+ β7Board Independenceit + β8Perform Evaluationit
+ β9State Ownershipit+β10Ownership Concentit + α11Debtit
+ α12Dividendit + α13Sizeit + α14Ageit + α15Investmentit
+ α16Growthit + α17Intangiblesit + εi t. (2)
From this specification, we test whether entrenchment when combined with a varia-
tion in CSP (hypothesis 3) or in workers’ satisfaction (hypothesis 4) has further negative
effects on financial performance. This test requires the inclusion of an interaction term
between variations in CSP and entrenchment practices. Moreover, consistent with what
we have mentioned in the theoretical section, we expect the complementarity between
both variables (entrenchment and increases in CSP) to appear mainly in a context
with efficient governance mechanisms, where managers who are set on entrenchment
will reinforce their strategy with the implementation of socially responsible actions.
In such situations, we expect intensive managerial entrenchment complemented with
improvements in socially responsible actions. Thus, we focus on the interactive variable
DEntrenchment DCSP that crosses the aforementioned variable DEntrenchment, which is
equal to Entrenchment when entrenchment is larger than the mean of the sector for
the corresponding year, with variations in CSP (DCSP). Following the same logic, we
define DEntrenchment DWorkers. Then, the complementarity hypothesis is supported if
the coefficient of such a variable is negative.
4. RESULTS
Table 1 shows information on the distribution of each variable of our study. The data
show that CSP has a median value which is in the middle of its range of definition
(49.4)16 while for Workers it is slightly higher (53.7). For Entrenchment, the median
value is 1 in a range between 0 and 4 and the ROA, as a variable of performance, has
16 Luxemburg, Finland, and Denmark are the countries with the largest values of CSP. Remarkably, Denmark
is also among the countries with the largest values for the entrenchment variable, which is in line with our
theoretical contention that relates both variables positively.
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a median value of 5%. Concerning the variables for internal control mechanism, their
median values are 3, 1, 1 and 1 for Control Committee; Non-dual CEO; Board Independence
and Performance Evaluation respectively, and for the remaining variables for internal
control mechanisms, State Ownership has a value of 0.5% and the sum of the stakes of
the three largest shareholders (Ownership Concentration) is 24%. Finally, in terms of the
control variables, the median size of a company in the sample is €7,064 million; the
age is 82 years; firm Debt is 90%, the Investment variable has a median value of 45.9%
and the median proportion of Intangibles is 26.3%.
Then, the inspection of this second quartile (median values), reveals that almost
all variables have non-null values.17 This eliminates concerns about the existence of
truncated distributions around the zero value. Table 1 also shows the evolution of the
variables comparing the first year of the sample (2002) with the latest one (2005). It is
remarkable that the variable for CSP increases steadily from a value of 37% in 2002 to a
value of 57.5% in 2005. This reflects the growing interest in socially responsible activities
over time.18 Precisely this fact allows using such activities as a managerial entrenchment
mechanism. Finally, in Table 1, we present a mean test analysis comparing firms with
large values of CSP to their counterparts. We find that among the companies with
large values of CSP, the Entrenchment variable has significantly larger values than its
counterparts (0.9 versus 0.7); while the variables for Performance show lower ones (5.2
versus 7.2 for ROA). This conforms to our theoretical contentions.
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix. On inspection of the correlation matrix,
we find that the variable of entrenchment is positively correlated (7%) with that
of CSP.19 This is particularly evident for anti-takeover initiatives, the deterioration
of voting rights (OneShare OneVote) as well as managerial tenure. Additionally, CSP
is also negatively correlated to different internal control mechanisms like the non-
duality between the CEO and the chairman of the board (Non-dual CEO), and the
proportion of independent directors. We interpret these results as evidence that,
when entrenchment is more difficult as a result of internal control pressures, CSP
initiatives are also less likely. However, we show in the following analysis that, if firms are
able to define a significant entrenchment strategy within a framework where internal
governance mechanisms are well developed, this has a positive impact on a firm’s
CSP.
Table 3 summarizes the regression analysis of specification (1), whereby we test the
effect of managerial entrenchment practices on CSP. Further, in Column 1 we break
the variable Entrenchment into its five components: Anti-takeover Shareholders Rights,
OneShare OneVote, Managown Entrench and Manager Tenure. We find that anti-takeover
measures, as well as managerial tenure, have a positive impact on CSP. Also, when
managers’ stake moves into the ‘entrenchment region’ (between 17% and 69.8%), it
has a positive impact on CSP. A second result shows that when entrenchment is more
17 Among the exceptions there are two components of the entrenchment variable (Anti-takeover and
Managown Entrench), although the aggregate entrenchment variable has a non-null median value.
18 For example, in the report ‘Green, Social, and Ethical Funds in Europe: 2005 Review’ of Avanzi SRI
Research and SiRi, we have observed a substantial increase in the number of SRI funds since 2003, and more
importantly that the total amount of SRI assets grew by about 99%: from a value of €12 billion, in 2003,
to a value of €24 billion at the end of the second quarter of 2005. This gives us an idea of the increasing
importance of social performance, as these ethical funds invest only in firms with high ratings in CSP.
19 This result is more significant when we look at variations in CSP; they are positively correlated with those
variations of entrenchment (13.6%). The correlations in differences for other variables show qualitatively
the same results and are available upon request from the authors.
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difficult, due to the presence of a significant proportion of independent members
on the board, or the existence of independent control committees, there is a negative
impact on CSP. This reflects the complementarity idea between entrenchment and CSP
on which this paper relies. Moreover, the aggregate measure of entrenchment has a
positive impact on CSP (Column 2). Once we look at the coefficient of the multiplicative
variables (Column 3), we find that entrenchment has a particularly positive impact on
CSP in those scenarios where entrenchment is more difficult ex-ante – mainly, that is,
when the number of control committees with independent members is larger than the
mean for the sector in the corresponding year; when there is a separation between
the CEO and the chairman of the board, as well as when the performance evaluation
systems are more developed than the average for the corresponding sector and year.
In such cases, corporate governance is more developed and, if the manager is set on
entrenchment, he complements this strategy with increases in CSP. This conforms to
hypothesis 1.
In addition, we find that a generous dividend policy hinders the implementation of
policies aimed at satisfying non-shareholder stakeholders. This result is in accordance
with the slack resources hypothesis of Waddock and Graves (1997), which suggests that
better financial performance results in a surplus of resources that provides firms with
the financial wherewithal to consider and do something about social issues. Finally, and
consistent with the growing interest in CSP issues, older firms (with an accumulated
reputation) show larger values in CSP.
Once we focus on workers’ satisfaction (Table 4), the results are, in essence, the same
as those for the overall score of CSP. This conforms to hypothesis 2. The significant
coefficient of anti-takeover measures in explaining a firm’s CSP is remarkable. This
is in accordance with Pagano and Volpin (2005), where wage concessions – that
improve workers’ satisfaction – are described as anti-takeover initiatives. The positive
sign for the State Ownership variable can be explained in terms of the willingness
of government-owned firm managers to satisfy workers as part of an entrenchment
strategy, given that public authorities consider workers as potential constituencies. This
will reinforce the position of managers in such firms. A similar argument can explain
the positive moderating role of the State Ownership variable in the connection between
entrenchment and CSP. Finally, the non-negative sign of the dividend variable can
be explained by the fact that workers may well have shares in the firm. In fact, the
non-significant sign may be the result of compensating the positive effect, due to the
dividends received, with the negative effect as dividends reduce the available resources
for satisfying workers’ interests.
In order to analyze the consequence of entrenchment combined with CSP, we
show in Tables 5A, 5B and 5C the results of estimating specification (2) using different
measures of performance. In Table 5A, we use ROA; in Table 5B, Tobin’s q; and in
Table 5C, abnormal returns derived from a single factor model.20
20 Given the endogeneity between market measures of performance and ownership structure (Demsetz
and Villalonga, 2001), we have detracted from the variable of entrenchment the component on managerial
ownership in those estimations that use market measures of performance (Tables 5B and 5C). Note that one
of the components of entrenchment (Managown Entrench) is defined in terms of a decreasing relationship
between managerial ownership and Tobin’s q.
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Once we focus on the estimations for ROA,21 we find that entrenchment has a
negative impact on ROA, a result which is consistent with previous literature (e.g.,
Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Also, we find that this effect is more significant when
entrenchment is large and is defined in combination with increases in CSP (Column 2)
and in workers’ satisfaction (Column 4). That is, there is a complementary relationship
between both variables: when there is an increase in social performance and/or in
workers’ satisfaction, the marginal effect of entrenchment; when significant, the effect
on the returns on assets is more negative. This conforms to hypotheses 3 and 4.
It is important to highlight that the results hold good for significant values of
entrenchment (larger than the mean for the sector and year). We have argued
previously that this corresponds to situations of large internal control, where we expect
that entrenchment, when it appears, triggers increases in socially responsible policies
that reinforce the power of the manager. This generates a decrease in performance.
Among the control variables, the positive effect of debt on performance is noteworthy.
This effect may be explained by the fact that it reduces managerial discretion (Jensen,
1986) and/or improves efficiency (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007).
The results on Tobin’s q and abnormal returns (Tables 5B and 5C respectively)
conform to those using ROA and are even clearer. Given the previous set of results,
we provide support for the thesis regarding the existence of an entrenchment motive
to justify certain increases in CSP, particularly when managerial control mechanisms
are well developed. In this case, entrenchment is less likely. However, if it does occur,
it is so intensive that it also triggers socially responsible actions. This is a reinforcing
mechanism, given that managerial collusion with non-shareholder stakeholders allows
them to channel stakeholders’ power against shareholders. In this situation there is a
clear negative impact on financial performance.
5. ROBUSTNESS
(i) Income Smoothing
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we maintain that one form
of earnings manipulation – income smoothing – is an additional entrenchment
mechanism. Managers smooth earnings as a natural entrenchment strategy in order to
ensure a stable stream of profits that will satisfy shareholders (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1995). However, although earnings manipulations improve financial performance in
the short term, they damage the medium-term interests of shareholders. The manager
anticipates this fact and has all the incentives to trigger entrenchment initiatives. Within
this setting, we characterize a situation where we expect, according to our theory, to
find an increase in CSP. This is a way to test the robustness of our results.
To test this contention, we use two alternative measures of income smoothing (Leuz
et al., 2003). First, we approach this variable through the correlation between changes in
accruals and changes in cash flow (Incsmooth1), where Accruals = (CA − Cash) −
(CL − STD) − DEP, when CA is the change in current assets; Cash is the
21 All variables of performance are defined in relative terms by subtracting the mean of the sector and year
from each firm’s performance value. This definition gives information on the real performance of each firm
when compared with the average for each sector in the year analyzed. Also, the demeaning of performance
allows us to eliminate sectoral, temporal and country effects.
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change in cash; CL is the change in current liabilities; STD is the change in debt
included in current liabilities; and DEP is depreciation and amortization. The second
measure (Incsmooth2) is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to the
standard deviation of cash-flows.22 In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we use the first
measure; while in Columns 3 and 4, we use the second measure.
From this table, we show that income smoothing has a positive impact on CSP as well
as on workers’ satisfaction. It is important to stress that this is not due to the increase
in the short-term financial performance due to earnings manipulation, because we
have controlled by a performance variable through the ROA. Our explanation, which
supports our basic theory, is that income smoothing is connected with entrenchment
practices that may further stimulate improvements in CSP.23
(ii) Expropriation of Minority Shareholders
We conduct an additional analysis to investigate if the changes of CSP and in
workers’ satisfaction are explained in terms of other agency problems like minority
expropriation, instead of entrenchment, as mentioned in the theoretical part. In the
corporate governance literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the presence of
blockholders (e.g., families) is contemplated to have an ambiguous effect on a firm’s
financial performance. On the positive side, blockholders diminish the entrenchment
possibilities of managers, which impacts positively on performance; but, on the negative
side, large shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders, thereby reducing the
market price of shares. One strategy that blockholders may follow to expropriate
minorities is the overinvestment in CSP (Barnea and Rubin, 2006). By implementing
certain social programs, blockholders receive the full benefits associated with CSP,
but only bear a portion of the costs to implement such policies (proportional to
their stakes). This association between ownership concentration and CSP found
support in some recent studies (Barnea and Rubin, 2006; and Neubaum and Zahra,
2006).
Bearing this idea in mind, it is important to distinguish improvements in CSP that are
connected to the entrenchment practices from those that may be explained in terms
of the implementation of expropriating strategies. We try to tackle this problem by
introducing variables for ownership concentration in each specification. In Table 7, we
extend this analysis and distinguish firms according to their ownership concentration
(Columns 1 and 2). This is proxied by the stake of the three largest blockholders.
Additionally, we distinguish between family firms – when the largest blockholder
belongs to a family – and non-family ones. Authors agree that expropriation is more
likely among the former firms. Finally, we compare firms where workers have substantial
power (e.g., they are unionized) with their counterparts (Columns 5 and 6). We define
firms with worker power as those where workers have board level responsibilities and/or
22 Unfortunately, we have no information on cash-flow statements and we estimate accruals from balance
sheet changes in working capital (excluding cash). Although this introduces some bias into the estimations
using the first measure (Hribar and Collins, 2002), the coincidence of the results, once we use the second
measure, gives us confidence in our analysis.
23 We have conducted an alternative analysis (available upon request from the authors) where earnings
manipulation is approached through the discretionary accruals obtained as the difference between the
accruals and those expected from the models given by Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al.
(2005), respectively. The results are consistent with those found using the proxies for income smoothing.
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benefit from profit-sharing programs. We expect that the agency problem between large
blockholders and minority ones will be less likely in firms with worker power, once we
take into consideration the workers’ stake in the firm.
We see from the results that the impact of our proxy of entrenchment on CSP has
only positive effects in those firms where ownership is not concentrated (lower than
the mean of the sector for the corresponding year), in non-family firms, and in firms
with significant worker power. In these firms, we expect that there is no expropriation
to minority shareholders. This ensures that the effect found on CSP is explained
exclusively in terms of entrenchment and not in terms of expropriation, and gives
further support to our results.
(iii) Leverage, Degree of Financial Markets Efficiency, and Size
As an additional robustness check, we conduct three additional analyses. First, we
split the sample into those firms whose leverage is larger than the mean of their
corresponding sector and year. The results, reported in the first two columns of Table 8,
show that the effect of entrenchment on CSP is only visible for high-leverage firms.
This is consistent with the idea that debt complements internal corporate governance
mechanisms to control managers and limit their discretion. As such, in accordance
with hypotheses 1, we expect that the impact of entrenchment on CSP should be more
significant for highly-leveraged firms.
A second analysis is performed by comparing firms whose country of origin has an
Anglo-Saxon legal code, to those whose countries have a German, or French origin
legal code. We have argued previously that financial markets are not fully efficient and
do not fully internalize the costs of implementing costly socially responsible actions
linked to entrenchment. This fact, among other things, explains the use of socially
responsible actions as an entrenchment device, even in the presence of external
corporate governance mechanisms. A consequence of this is that the results connecting
entrenchment and CSP should be more evident in countries with less developed
financial markets. As La Porta et al. (1998) show, countries with French and German
origin legal codes have less developed financial markets compared with Anglo-Saxon
ones. Consistently, we find that entrenchment only explains our measure for CSP in
countries whose legal codes have French or German origins. Note also that countries
with less developed external corporate control mechanisms are also those with more
developed internal corporate control mechanisms acting as substitutes of the former
(Dargenidou et al., 2007). In such cases, according to our hypothesis 1, a much stronger
impact of entrenchment on CSP should be expected.
A final concern is the existence of a possible sample selection bias given that the
firms in our sample are mainly large firms. In order to investigate such an issue in more
detail, we split the sample into large firms (size larger than the mean of the sector for the
corresponding year) and small ones. The results (Columns 5 and 6) show, as expected,
that the effect is slightly more significant for large firms, but also appears for small
ones. This means that size of firm may have some effects, but our results are still valid
for smaller firms. This excludes problems linked to sample selection bias.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the implementation of entrenchment
strategies on socially responsible actions. Our basic premise is that the manager
C© 2008 The Authors
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may be controlled by shareholders – externally through the financial markets and
internally through the board of directors – as well as by the activism of different
stakeholders. Within such a context, entrenchment strategies aimed at hindering
the actions of shareholders are ineffective, unless accompanied by other measures
tailored to neutralize stakeholder pressure. In this case, there are two possibilities:
confrontation with stakeholders; or collusion – so as to satisfy their interests. We argue
that an entrenched manager will choose the collusion strategy, especially when internal
corporate governance mechanisms are well developed. In such a situation, the collusion
with non-shareholder stakeholders will not only tackle the pressure from stakeholders
but will, more importantly, channel the salience of these stakeholders against agents –
shareholders – who intend to replace the manager.
We tested this claim by looking at the connection between entrenchment and
the scores for corporate social performance (CSP) as well as for worker satisfaction.
We find that there is a clear positive impact of the former on the latter variables,
especially in those firms with efficient internal corporate governance mechanisms like
the existence of independent control committees, the separation between the CEO
and the chairman of the board, and the implementation of performance evaluation
schemes. This confirms the main theoretical contention of the paper: a firm’s socially
responsible activities may form part of a manager’s entrenchment strategy.
Additionally, we prove the robustness of this contention by using an alternative proxy
of entrenchment that is the implementation of earnings manipulation practices based
on income smoothing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Our results are fully consistent
with the theoretical claim.
The second step in our analysis consists of looking at the impact on performance
brought on by an entrenchment strategy. We find that the negative impact on
financial performance is more pronounced when an intensive entrenchment strategy
is combined with increases in socially responsible actions. Accordingly, we argue that
an intensive entrenchment policy is a reaction to the existence of stringent internal
governance mechanisms. In such a situation, although entrenchment is less likely, a
manager set on entrenchment combines such an aggressive strategy with the develop-
ment of socially responsible activities. This combination has particularly negative effects
on shareholders’ wealth. This factor is further evidence that entrenched managers heed
stakeholder satisfaction not only as a consequence of stakeholder activism, but also as
a way of reinforcing their entrenchment strategy against shareholders.
Remarkably, our result also holds true when we focus on a stakeholder group,
the workers. We argue that these stakeholders are amongst the most powerful
and the entrenched manager should pay particular attention to looking after their
interests.
Finally, we show that the results are more pronounced in countries with less efficient
financial markets (civil law countries) and more developed internal corporate control
mechanisms. In such countries, managers can take advantage of that inefficiency and
over-invest in socially responsible activities in order to complement an entrenchment
strategy, given that market prices do not fully reflect the cost of implementing
these activities. Also, we discard other explanations linked to the implementation of
expropriating policies in order to explain the increases in social performance. We also
prove that increases in CSP linked to entrenchment appear in firms with low ownership
concentration, particularly in non-family firms, and in firms where workers enjoy
significant power. Minority expropriation is less likely in such firms; so that therefore,
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the increases in CSP are due to entrenchment and not connected to expropriating
issues.
(i) Implications
This work forms a bridge between the corporate governance literature and stakeholder
theory. According to this latter line of research, the management of stakeholders is a
good way of improving financial results (Jones, 1995), whereas corporate governance
emphasizes the difficulty in reconciling the demands of a wide set of stakeholders
(Jensen, 2001; and Tirole, 2001). We show that trying to satisfy different stakeholders’
interests, independently of their salience, may have adverse consequences on perfor-
mance when combined with the implementation of entrenchment policies. Then, it is
not good policy to give managers any leeway in determining the degree of satisfaction
of non-shareholder stakeholders because managers may choose socially responsible
activities strategically to complement entrenchment initiatives. Furthermore, we find
that the existence of strong internal corporate governance mechanisms is not a
guarantee that CSP may not be misused. In fact, the linkage between CSP and
entrenchment is stronger for those firms with strong corporate governance. So how
does one deal with such a problem?
There are different possibilities. First, in line with Cespa and Cestone (2007), if a
firm’s CSP may be used as an integral part of an entrenchment strategy, then some
form of governance mechanism that hinders managerial discretion on social issues is
needed. A possibility is to regulate social issues in order to avoid overinvestment in
socially responsible actions. Undoubtedly, mandatory accounting practices to reflect
these issues on the balance sheet may be a first step in this direction. A second way
to prevent entrenchment problems, especially when involving other stakeholders,
is to transfer ownership to this group. For example, if workers also have shares in
a firm, it will not make sense for the manager to implement simultaneously an
entrenchment strategy of confrontation with shareholders and another of collusion
with other stakeholders like workers, because the interests of the latter will also be
aligned with those of shareholders. Paradoxically, the interests of shareholders are
better defended by transferring part of their powers to other stakeholders.
(ii) Competing Hypotheses and Future Research
Alternative theoretical arguments may compete with our entrenchment hypothesis.
First, we can explain the positive connection between entrenchment and CSP by
looking at normative or self-promotion motives (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
Managers with high ethical standards would promote CSP while, at the same time,
define entrenchment strategies that are geared towards the wellbeing of the firm
according to themselves. Within such a framework, CSP is used normatively, not
strategically, and generates the same set of results that we obtain: a positive connection
with entrenchment and, when complemented with this latter variable, a negative
effect on performance. In order to distinguish this hypothesis from our theoretical
contention, we need to enlarge the windows of years of analysis, given that we suspect
that socially friendly initiatives based on ethical grounds will be less sensitive to the
economic cycle than are strategic ones. The investigation of this issue is left for future
research once new sets of data become available. However, as preliminary evidence, we
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find that when we compare the results for the first year of our sample with those of the
last year, the latter are more significant. This conforms to a strategic use of CSP as an
entrenchment mechanism based on the fact that social awareness has been growing
over time. Under a normative view, we would not observe these differences over time.
A second competing argument is that managers seek the social prestige and
legitimacy of being good corporate citizens. Such managers will try to maintain their
status by implementing CSP while, at the same time, entrenching their position in the
firm so as to enjoy the benefits of such status. The outcome of such a combination
is a negative effect on performance. This hypothesis, however, cannot explain the
positive moderating role of internal corporate control mechanisms in connecting
entrenchment and CSP, just as we find in our empirical analysis.
Finally, the positive association between entrenchment and socially responsible
activities may be explained by the view that managers, who resort to such practices,
will be able to develop longer-term relationships with stakeholders such as customers,
suppliers, workers, and communities. This view will expand the set of value-creating
exchanges and, therefore, generate better results. In order to ensure the longevity of
such valuable relationships managers may trigger entrenchment strategies. However,
this positive view of managerial entrenchment is not supported by the performance
analysis conducted in this study; we find a negative impact of the combination of
entrenchment and CSP on financial results.
Our work can be expanded in several directions. One research avenue consists
of investigating, in greater depth, the connection between ownership structure and
the entrenchment motive behind some socially responsible activities. The type of
blockholder and its social sensitivity is expected to be relevant in the strategic use
of CSP as an entrenchment mechanism. Finally, a further investigation on different
institutional contexts may also be of interest, given the significant differences that exist
in top-management orientation across countries. In Anglo-Saxon countries, managers
are more inclined to satisfy shareholders’ interests, while in Continental Europe and
Japan, managers have traditionally been more sensitive to the development of long-term
relationships with employees, banks, and suppliers. The investigation of this aspect as
well as other issues is left for future research.
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